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WHAT CAN ONE REASONABLY SAY ABOUT NONEXISTENCE?
A TIBETAN WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF ASRAYASIDDHA
The fallacy of asrayasiddhahetu, or a “logical reason whose basis is
unestablished” arises when the subject of an argument is nonexistent;
in usual cases, this subject failure implies that the proposition to be
proved (sadhya) cannot be established – Buddhists such as Dharmakırti
repeatedly stress that when the subject fails, a debate about its properties
ceases. To take an invented example, if one says that “Pegasus flies
around the Aegean”, it suffices to show that there is no Pegasus and one
will have, ipso facto, short-circuited the question of “his” flight, or even
proved the contrary, i.e. that he does not fly. Similarly, if someone shows
that the Primordial Matter (pradhana) accepted in Sam. khya philosophy
does not actually exist, then the Sam. khya’s own thesis that pradhana
has such and such properties will thereby be refuted.1 The problem
however becomes thorny when one is proving simple nonexistence
of some pseudo-entity, for then the case should be different from that
of Pegasus’s supposed flight. The height of absurdity would be if all
proofs of nonexistence became self-refuting because the subject failed
to exist.
The problem of asrayasiddha is taken up in various Buddhist
contexts – typically in connection with proofs of momentariness
(ks.an. abha _ngasiddhi)
2 and in connection with later Madhyamaka proofs
of the absence of intrinsic nature (nih. svabhavata). Although it is certainly
not our intention to inventory all the considerable Indian and Tibetan
Buddhist literature on this problem of asrayasiddha, or even the major-
ity of texts in which the problem figures, certain seminal works do
stand out and are repeatedly cited. Besides passages from Dignaga, we
should mention the substantial and influential sections in Dharmakırti’s
Praman. avarttika IV, k. 136–148 and Praman. aviniscaya III, as well as
those in the works of Kamalasıla, in particular his Madhyamakaloka.
The Tibetan treatment is largely centered around Tsong kha pa’s dBu
ma rgyan gyi zin bris, his commentary on the Madhyamakalam. kara in
which he integrates and elaborates upon the key passages in Dignaga,
Dharmakırti and Kamalasıla. Although there are some relatively brief
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passages in the Sa skya pa Rigs gter and Praman. avarttika commentaries
(e.g. gSer mdog Pan. chen Sakya mchog ldan sketches out some sig-
nificant differences from the treatment in dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris3),
it does seem that the problem of asrayasiddha was not treated nearly
as thoroughly in the other schools as in the dGe lugs, where it became
a recurring topos figuring markedly in numerous works. The present
article consists primarily in a translation of the section on asrayasiddha
in a text by A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759–1840), a dGe lugs pa
scholar who was from the A la shan region of Inner Mongolia but wrote
in Tibetan and who was, in our opinion, remarkable for his clear and
often quite innovative thinking. His gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag is a
Madhyamaka work, one that treats of various problems centered around
the Svatantrika Madhyamaka’s use of the ekanekaviyogahetu (= gcig
du bral gyi gtan tshigs “neither one nor many reason [for sunyata]”).
For Ngag dbang bstan dar the problem of asrayasiddha arises when
the Madhyamaka uses logical reasons like the ekanekaviyogahetu to
prove ultimate voidness of things; it also occurs when he uses logical
reasoning to prove that pseudo-entities do not exist at all. Ngag dbang
bstan dar, thus, like his Indian and Tibetan Svatantrika predecessors,
zig-zags between the Madhyamaka and logicians’ positions, using the
latter to buttress the former.
A striking aspect of the later Indian and Tibetan explanations of
asrayasiddha is that certain earlier texts are almost invariably cited in
later ones, giving a kind of “unfolding telescope” effect where each
subsequent text includes its predecessors but seems to enlarge upon
them and carry the ideas a few steps further, all the while seeking to
remain faithful to the original intentions of Dignaga. This impression is,
however, potentially misleading. In fact, be it the position of Kamalasıla,
that of Tsong kha pa or Ngag dbang bstan dar, what is at stake is
a complex synthesis of disparate doctrine that has been elaborated
over time; it would thus be a mistake if the seeming elegance of the
unfolding telescope presentations lulled us into thinking that the later
presentation was also ahistorically present ab initio. Lopez, in his Study
of Svatantrika, has described the Tibetan theory on asrayasiddha as it
is found in Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab and lCang skya rol pa’i rdo rje
and others: this constitutes the received position for Ngag dbang bstan
dar. The section in dBu ma rgyan gyis zin bris treating of asrayasiddha
has been translated in Tillemans (1984). As we shall try to show in
the rather extensive explanatory notes to our translation, the positions
that we find in Tsong kha pa, Ngag dbang bstan dar and others had an
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intricate history that certainly did not just consist in bringing out what
Dignaga and Dharmakırti and Kamalasıla had already understood.
Various works of bsTan dar have been studied by now, and it is
becoming clear that this later dGe lugs pa thinker did make significant
contributions, especially in the domain of ideas and arguments where
he often shows originality in building upon and reinterpreting earlier
writers.4 The gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag, and in particular the
section on asrayasiddha, is a good case in point. On certain topics,
such as avoidance of asrayasiddha in cases of simple, non-implicative,
negation (prasajyapratis.edha), bsTan dar makes a radical break with
his Indian and Tibetan predecessors, and arguably he is right to do so.
The rapprochement with the Madhyamaka debate on “concordantly
appearing subjects” (chos can mthun snang ba) is also noteworthy for
its philosophical interest, turning as it does on the general problem of
the incommensurability of rival theories.
Readers will probably recognize that the problem of talking about
non-being has a long history, not only in the East, but in the West,
including its twentieth century technical treatment in formal logic’s
theory of descriptions and in the theory of presuppositions. We add
this later Tibetan position on what is one of the most recurrent and
interesting problems of philosophy.
TRANSLATION
x1. Secondly, the doubt that the subject (chos can; dharmin) might be
unestablished, when one presents the formal argument (sbyor ngag;
prayogavakya). [Objection:] If we follow what is literally stated in
the Madhyamakalam. kara, it is evident that one also presents partless
consciousness, Primordial Matter (spyi gtso bo; pradhana) and so forth5
as subjects of enquiry (shes ’dod chos can) for a valid logical reason.6
Thus this [reason] would have an unestablished basis (gzhi ma grub
pa; asrayasiddha). Would it not then result that the reason would be
one which is unestablished (ma grub pa; asiddha) because the entity
of the subject does not exist?7
x2. By way of a reply to this [objection], many scholars have said that
there is no [such] fault so long as one presents simple negations (med
dgag; prasajyapratis.edha) as both the reason and the property to be
proved (bsgrub bya’i chos; sadhyadharma), but that should one present
a positive phenomenon (sgrub pa; vidhi) or an implicative negation
(ma yin dgag; paryudasapratis.edha), it will then be an unestablished
reason.8 This does indeed seem to be based on certain statements [in
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the works] of Tsong kha pa and his disciples, such as [the passage] in
[Tsong kha pa’s] dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal that reads:
The fact that there is no fault, even though the subject stated for that reason might
be negated, is due to the essential feature that both the reason and the property [to
be proved] are mere exclusions (rnam bcad tsam; vyavacchedamatra).
However this alone can not eliminate all doubt. Thus it is necessary
to explain things as follows. There are cases where [the reason] would
not be a reason that is unestablished, in spite of the fact that one
might present either an implicative negation or a positive phenomenon
for both the reason and the property to be proved. For example, an
argument such as “Take as the subject, a rabbit’s horn; it is fitting to
be designated by the word ‘moon’, because it exists as an object of
conceptual thought.” – this [argument] is the idea of ’Jam dbyangs
bzhad pa’i rdo rje.9 Alternatively [there could be the argument], “Take
as the subject, being gored by a rabbit’s horn; this is a fallacious reason
for proving that a person is in pain, because it is a reason that does
not have the triple character [needed] for proving that a person is in
pain” – this [argument] is the idea in [dGe ’dun grub pa’s] Tshad ma
rigs rgyan.10
x3. The reason why these [arguments] are not reasons that are
unestablished because the entity of the subject does not exist devolves
from the essential feature that when something is [qualified by] either the
reasons or properties to be proved in the proof of these [propositions],
it need not be existent. So, even when simple negations are presented
as both the reason and property [to be proved], there can also be the
fault of the subject being unestablished provided that either the reason
or property to be proved in the proof in question is pervaded by being
existent, as for example when one proves that [something nonexistent
like a rabbit’s horn] is the subtle selflessness of the elements (chos
kyi bdag med; dharmanairatmya) by means of the reason, “being the
consummate [nature]” (yongs grub; parinis.panna).
11 Consequently,
when one presents an unestablished basis as the subject, then all cases
where a thing’s being held to be [qualified by] the reason necessitates
its being existent will [incur the fault of] being fallacious reasons
unestablished because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject,
but when being held to be [qualified by] the reason does not necessitate
being existent, then the [reason] will not be fallacious. The details
of this way [of distinguishing between faulty reasons and valid ones]
should be correctly brought out.
x4. In general, the subject of an argument is of two sorts, the subject
that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus (rang rten chos can)12 and
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a nominal subject (chos can ’ba’ zhig pa; kevaladharmin).13 Between
these two, the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus
is, e.g., when one proves to a Sam. khya that sound is impermanent by
means of the reason that it is produced, for at that time one proves
impermanence based upon the simple [commonly recognized entity]
sound. A nominal subject is, e.g., when one proves to a Vaises.ika
that the space, which is [taken by the Vaises.ika to be] a real entity
(dngos por gyur pa’i nam mkha’; vastubhutakasa), is not [in fact] a
permanent substance [as they maintain it is] by means of the reason
that it does not serve as the locus for other qualities. [This is called a
“nominal subject”] because, at that time, one is not proving that being
a permanent substance is located in a real entity, space, and thus this
type of space is just merely presented as the subject, but is not the
locus or subject.14 Now, something’s being a “nominal subject” means
that although it might be stated as the subject, it is not the locus of the
property to be proved (sadhyadharma), and is thus an unrelated subject.
Consequently, although the nominal subject, i.e. the stated subject [as
Tsong kha pa refers to it in x2 above], in the argument in question
[against the Vaises.ika] is an unestablished basis, the subject that is the
[proponent’s] own [intended] locus does exist, because at that time it is
what appears to the conceptual thought grasping the real entity space
(vastubhutakasa) as excluded from the contrary of real space that is the
[actual] subject or locus for the proof in question. It follows that this is
so, because [this appearance] is like that [i.e. is the actual locus], due
to the fact that the desire to know (shes ’dod; jij~nasa) occurs once the
opponent has mistakenly taken this type of space and the [conceptual]
appearance as such [a space] to be identical.15 Therefore, in order that
we understand this difference between the fact that in the argument in
question the subject that is the [proponent’s] own locus is an established
basis, while the nominal subject that is presented in the actual words is
not an established basis, [Dignaga] stated in the Praman. asamuccaya:
With regard to the [proponent’s] own locus (rang rten la), [a thesis is not opposed]
by perceptible states of affairs, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly
recognized.16
The purpose behind [Dignaga’s] not saying “the [proponent’s] own
subject” (rang gi chos can; svadharmin) here but rather “the [propo-
nent’s] own locus” (rang gi rten), was explained in extenso in thirteen
verses from the Pratyaks.apariccheda in Praman. avarttika, verses that
begin “sarvatra vadino : : : svao : : : ”.17
x5. [Objection:] Then, it would follow [absurdly] that the appearance
as something excluded from not-sound (sgra ma yin pa las log par
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snang ba) would also be the subject that is the [proponent’s] own locus
when proving that sound is impermanent by means of the reason that
it is produced, because that is what you asserted [about space].
x6. [Reply:] This is not the same, because of the following: if
something is a valid reason it must be established on the basis of
the subject of enquiry in accordance with its mode of presentation
(’god tshul),18 and so, because the appearance to conceptual thought as
something excluded from not-sound is an imagined entity (kun brtags;
parikalpita), it does not concord at all with being a product.19 This
follows, for it was stated in [Tsong kha pa’s] dBu ma rgyan gyi zin
bris:
If one is proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then as the
exclusion qua appearance (snang ldog), which appears to conceptual thought as
excluded from not sound, is not a real entity (dngos po), the reason, i.e. being
produced, does not qualify it. Rather, [being produced] must qualify the basis of
the appearance (snang gzhi), i.e. sound. This is due to the essential feature that real
entities (dngos po) are taken as the reason and property to be proved.
The [latter] necessary implication (khyab pa; vyapti) holds, because (a)
it is obvious that a conceptual appearance will not be established as
the subject of enquiry of an argument where real entities are presented
as the reason and property to be proved, and (b) it was stated in the
rNam nges dar t.ık [of rGyal tshab rje]:
The [two cases] are not the same, because the conceptual appearance of space is
the subject that is the basis ascertained as [qualified by] the previous reason [in the
argument against the Vaises.ika], but what appears to conceptual thought as sound
cannot be the basis that is ascertained as produced.
x7. To summarize, although we present space as the subject to the
Vaises.ika, it is not the subject, but the appearance of this [space] is the
subject. And when we prove that sound is impermanent by means of the
reason, being produced, what appears as sound to conceptual thought
does not serve as the subject, rather it is mere sound itself that serves as
the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus. The reason
for this, if one carries it as far as possible, comes down to whether
there is or is not a subject that appears concordantly (chos can mthun
snang ba) to both the Buddhist and the Vaises.ika, for the Buddhist
accepts space as being a simple negation (med dgag) consisting in the
mere denial of obstruction and contact, whereas the Vaises.ika accepts
that it is a real entity (dngos po) that is independent (rang dbang ba)
and is a positive phenomenon (sgrub pa).20
x8. [Objection:] Then it would follow that even sound would not
appear concordantly to both [parties], because the Buddhist asserts that
sound is derived from the elements (’byung ’gyur; bhautika), whereas
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the Vaises.ika asserts that sound is a quality of space (nam mkha’i yon
tan; akasagun. a).
x9. [Reply:] This is completely different on account of the essential
feature that, to both these [parties], a mere object grasped by the auditive
consciousness is established as appearing concordantly as an object
found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition (tshad ma; praman. a),
21
whereas in the case of space, if [the parties] were to search for the
designated object (btags don), they would find no object established
as appearing concordantly apart from the mere verbal designation.
x10. Moreover, the omniscient lCang skya [Rol pa’i rdo rje] has
said that rGyal tshab rje maintained that the conceptual appearance
(rtog pa’i snang ba) was the subject, but that mKhas grub rje did not
accept that verbal objects (sgra don; sabdartha) [i.e. conceptual entities]
were the subject.22 And the omniscient ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa has
said that taking Primordial Matter as the subject was Dignaga’s idea,
and that Dharmakırti’s idea was to take the conceptual appearance as
the subject. However, suppose we examine their ideas carefully. Then
whomsoever’s position we might take, be it that of Dignaga and his
disciple [Dharmakırti] or that of Tsong kha pa and his disciples [rGyal
tshab rje and mKhas grub rje], if we presented an argument like “Take
as the subject, Primordial Matter; it is not the substratum (nyer len;
upadana) for its various manifestations (rnam ’gyur; vikr. ti), because it
is not preceived to be the substratum of its various manifestations”,23
none would deny that it is correct to take what appears as excluded from
not-Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial
Matter (gtso bo ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log par
snang ba) as being the subject of this argument. For it was stated in
the Madhyamakaloka [of Kamalasıla]:
It is just what exists as an aspect of mind, but is metaphorically designated by the
infantile as external and real, that is the subject. Therefore, one negates Primordial
Matter and the like in dependence upon that.24
x11. There is a necessary implication (khyab pa; vyapti) here [between
what the passage from the Madhyamakaloka says and the fact that the
subject is a conceptual appearance], because [Kamalasıla’s] words “It
is just what exists as an aspect of mind that is the subject” make it
clear that he holds the conceptual appearance to be the subject.25 This
is also the case because of the following quotations. It is said in the
Svarthanumanapariccheda [of Dharmakırti’s Praman. avarttika]:
A verbal object [can] be a dharma of three types [a basis for existence, for non-
existence or for both].
[To which] [Dharmakırti’s] Svavr. tti states:
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Thus, those who depend upon this subject [deliberate about existence and non-
existence, asking whether] this object that is represented by the word “Primordial
Matter” [does or does not have a real substratum].26
In the commentary on this [passage] Sakyabuddhi says:
What is expressed by the word “Primordial Matter”, that alone is the subject.
And in [mKhas grub rje’s] rNam ’grel t.ık chen rigs pa’i rgya mtsho it
is said:
This means that because it is generally taught that all conceptual appearances are
verbal objects (sgra don; sabdartha),27 what appears as Primordial Matter to the
conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter is also established as being a verbal
object. And in this way it is the exclusion qua basis (gzhi ldog) of the verbal object
for Primordial Matter, or [in other words] it is just what appears as Primordial Matter
to conceptual thought, that is the subject of this argument.28
x12. Here an opponent might say: Take as the subject the verbal
object for Primordial Matter (gtso bo’i sgra don); it would follow that
this would be the subject of that argument [mentioned earlier], because
the appearance as Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping
Primordial Matter (gtso bo ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba) is
the subject of that argument.
x13. [We would reply:] There is no necessary implication (ma khyab).
x14. [The opponent:] It would follow that there is a necessary
implication, because the appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual
thought is the verbal object for Primordial Matter.
x15. [We would reply:] Again there is no necessary implication,
because there is a difference between an exclusion qua thing itself
(rang ldog) and an exclusion qua basis [of the thing] (gzhi ldog).29 For
it was stated in the same [rNam ’grel] T. ık chen [of mKhas grub rje]:
Therefore, the subject when one says, “Primordial Matter is not existent, because
it is not perceived” is neither a real (dngos po ba) Primordial Matter, nor is it the
exclusion qua thing itself of the verbal object for Primordial Matter (gtso bo’i sgra
don gyi rang ldog). Why? This very appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual
thought is asserted by the Sam. khyas to be the [actual] Primordial Matter endowed
with the five qualities, but in our own system we assert that it is a verbal object.
Thus, the conceptual appearance as Primordial Matter is considered to be the subject,
because it is the basis of the debate about whether [something] is or is not the
Primordial Matter endowed with the five qualities.
A differentiation between the exclusion qua thing itself (rang ldog)
and the exclusion qua basis [for the thing] (gzhi ldog) is extremely
valuable in this context.30
x16. This [point] is related to the essential feature that although the
Sam. khya believes in this type of conceptual appearance, he does not
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believe that this appearance is a verbal object, for in [mKhas grub rje’s]
Tshad ma yid kyi mum sel it is said:
Also for the foolish opponent to say that the verbal object for this type of [auton-
omous and substantially existent (rang rkya thub pa’i rdzas yod)] self is the subject
would be a proclamation of his own faults since he accepts that the verbal object
of this type of self (de lta bu bdag gi sgra don) does not [really] exist.
x17. Thus, it is indeed correct that the conceptual appearance is the
subject, but when one is refuting an opponent’s position, one does not
have to present literally the conceptual appearance as being the subject.
Why? It is because the very Primordial Matter, permanent Isvara,
autonomous persons and so forth in which the opponent believes must
be explicitly presented as the subjects in just the same way [as the
opponent believes in them]. Otherwise there would be the fault that
Primordial Matter and so forth would not be negated in themselves
(rang ldog nas).31 For in [rGyal tshab rje’s] rNam ’grel thar lam gsal
byed it was said:
Their thought according to the Lord of scholars, Kamalasıla, was that Primordial
Matter had to be refuted by [explicitly] taking it as the subject. Otherwise, although
[the property of] being the substratum of various manifestations might be negated,
Primordial Matter would not be negated in itself (rang ldog nas). The basis for
ascertaining the reason with a praman. a is maintained to be just the appearance as
Primordial Matter (gtso bor snang ba nyid ).32
x18. [Objection:] In that case, it follows that the conceptual appearance
cannot correctly be held to be the subject, because it is void of ability to
perform a function (don byed nus pa; arthakriyasamarthya). There is a
necessary implication, because whatever is void of ability to perform a
function cannot properly be a basis of deliberation for the perspicacious
(rtog ldan; preks. avat). In this vein, the Praman. avarttika stated:
What point is there, for those who have such an aim, in deliberations about a thing
that has no ability to perform a function? Why should a woman filled with desire
wonder whether a eunuch was handsome or not?
x19. [We reply:] There is no necessary implication (ma khyab). This
is for the following reasons. The meaning of this quotation is that when
someone hopes his desired effect will ensue from some basis, then the
basis about which he deliberates must have the ability to perform the
function. Thus, [Dharmakırti] illustrates [his point about the uselessness
of deliberation about inefficient things] saying that it is inappropriate,
because it would be like, for example, a woman, intent upon sexual
pleasure, who took as the subject [of her thought] a eunuch, and after
[mistakenly] hearing that he could perform the acts that would give [her
pleasure], wondered whether he was handsome or not. Nonetheless,
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in general, things that are void of ability to perform a function can
properly be bases for [positive] proofs and negations. Indeed, the direct
basis (dngos rten) for proofs and negations must inevitably be a verbal
object. This follows, because:
(a) the reason why the direct basis must be a verbal object when one is
denying that sound is permanent or proving that it is impermanent
by the reason of its being produced is also grounded in the fact33
that the conceptual thought that proves or negates relies upon verbal
objects;
(b) it was said in the Pararthanumanapariccheda [of Praman. avarttika],
: : : We accept that all [positive] proof and negation (vidhinis. edhana) here [in
practical activity (vyavahara)] is in reliance upon a verbal object : : : , which
has no external basis;34
(c) when it is said that permanence is negated and impermanence is
proved with regard to sound, what is meant [here] is the performance
of the function of conceptual thought (rtog pa’i don byed), and
thus, on such an occasion, particular (rang mtshan pa; svalaks.an. a)
sounds, impermanent things or products and so forth do not directly
(dngos su) appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.
In this vein, it was stated in [Tsong kha pa’s] dBu ma rgyan gyi zin
bris:
The [Praman. a]varttika, the sense of Dignaga’s statements, states:
However, this condition of practical designations in terms of what infers (anumana)
[i.e. the logical reason] and the proposition to be inferred (anumeyartha) is constructed
in dependence upon a difference established by means of [conceptual] thought.35
Following this explanation, in cases where the basis must be a real entity (dngos
po), [such as when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced
or that there is fire on the smoky hill, the direct basis (dngos rten) for these proofs
and negations is just the object that is the appearance of sound or hill to conceptual
thought as things excluded from what they are not. Sound and hill are not, however,
themselves direct bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual thought
that proves or negates.
As for the meaning of conceptual thought performing the function of
negation and proof, it is as follows. When, for example, the quality
of the subject (phyogs chos; paks.adharma) is established for proving
sound to be impermanent by the reason that it is a product, then from
the perspective of the opponent, it is as if sound is initially established
and after that producthood newly depends upon sound. There is such
an appearance (snang tshul), but in reality (gnas tshod la) there is no
such progression.
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TIBETAN TEXT OF THE EXCERPT FROM THE GCIG DU BRAL GYI RNAM
BZHAG
x1. [453.2; f. 16b] gnyis pa sbyor ngag tu bkod na chos can ma grub
pa’i dogs pa ni / dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig zin ltar na / shes pa cha med
dang spyi gtso bo sogs kyang rtags sbyor yang dag gi shes ’dod chos
can du bkod par mngon pas / de gzhi ma grub pa yin pas rtags de chos
can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs su mi ’gyur ram zhe
na /
x2. de’i lan la mkhas pa mang pos / rtags dang bsgrub bya’i chos
gnyis char med dgag yin pa bkod na skyon med kyang sgrub pa dang
ma yin dgag bkod na ma grub pa’i rtags su ’gyur zhes smras so // de
ni rNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal las /
rtags desa smras pa’i chos can bkag kyang skyon med pa ni rtags dang chos gnyis
ka rnam bcad tsamb yin pa’i gnad kyis so //c
zhes pa lta bu rJe yab sras kyi gsung ’ga’ zhig la brten par snang
mod / de tsam gyis dogs pa’i mtha’ sel mi nus pas ’di ltar bshad dgos
te / rtags dang bsgrub bya’i chos gnyis char ma yin dgag dang sgrub
pa gang rung bkod kyang ma grub pa’i rtags su mi ’gyur ba yang yod
de / ri bong rwa chos [454; f. 17a] can zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjod
rung yin te / rtog yul na yod pa’i phyir zhes pa’i sbyor ba lta bu’o //
’di ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje’i dgongs pa’o // yang ri bong
rwas phug pa chos can / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa’i rtags ltar
snang yin te / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa’i tshul gsum ma yin
pa’i gtan tshigs yin pa’i phyir zhes pa’i sbyor ba lta bu ste / ’di Tshad
ma rigs rgyan gyi dgongs pa’o //
x3. de dag chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs su
mi ’gyur ba’i rgyu mtshan de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya’i chos
gang rung yin na yod pa yin mi dgos pa’i gnad kyis yin pas / des na
rtags chos gnyis kar med dgag bkod na yang de sgrub kyi rtags dang
bsgrub bya’i chos gang rung yin na yod pas khyab pa can yin na chos
can ma grub pa’i skyon du ’gyur ba yang yod de / dper na yongs grub
kyi rtags kyis chos kyi bdag med phra mo sgrub pa lta bu’o // de’i
phyir gzhi ma grub pa chos can du bkod pa’i tshe rtags su bzung ba de
yin na yod pa yin dgos phyin chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub
pa’i gtan tshigs ltar snang du ’gyur la / rtags su bzung ba de yin na
yod pa yin mi dgos na gtan tshigs ltar snang du mi ’gyur ba’i tshul la
zhib cha legs par thon dgos so //
a dGongs pa rab gsal: des. bsTan dar: de’i.
b bsTan dar omits tsam.
c dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal f. 200a.
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x4. spyir sbyor ba’i chos can la rang rten gyi chos can dang chos
can ’ba’ zhig pa gnyis las / rang rten gyi chos can ni / Grangs can
pa’i ngord byas pa’i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa lta bu yin te
/ de’i tshe sgra nyid la mi rtag pa brten [455; f. 17b] par sgrub pa yin
pa’i phyir ro // chos can ’ba’ zhig pa ni / Bye brag pa’i ngor yon tan
gzhan gyi rten mi byed pa’i rtags kyis dngos por gyur pa’i nam mkha’
rtag rdzas ma yin par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de’i tshe dngos por gyur
ba’i nam mkha’ la rtag rdzas brten par sgrub pa ma yin pas / de ’dra’i
nam mkha’ de rten gzhi chos can du ma song bar chos can du bkod pa
’ba’ zhig pa yin pa’i phyir / chos can ’ba’ zhig pa zhes pa’i don yang
chos can du smras kyang bsgrub bya’i chos kyi rten du ma song bar
chos can yan gar bar song ba’i don yin pas / de’i phyir sbyor ba de
sgrub kyi chos can ’ba’ zhig pa ste smras pa’i chos can gzhi ma grub
kyang rang rten gyi chos can yod pa yin te / de’i tshe dngos gyur gyi
nam mkha’ ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la dngos gyur gyi nam mkha’ ma yin pa
las log par snang ba de sgrub kyi rten gzhi’i chos can du song ba yin
pa’i phyir / der thal / phyi rgol gyis de ’dra ba’i nam mkha’ dang der
snang ba gnyis gcig tu ’khrul nas shes ’dod zhugs pa’i rgyu mtshan
gyis de ltar yin pa’i phyir / des na sbyor ba de sgrub kyi rang rten gyi
chos can gzhi grub cing tshig yin la bkod pa’i chos can ’ba’ zhig pa
gzhi ma grub pa’i khyad par ’di ’dra shes pa’i ched du / Tshad ma kun
btus las /
mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang yid ches grags pas rang rten la’o //e
zhes rang gi chos can ma smos par rang gi rten smos pa’i dgos pa /
rNam ’grel mngon sum le’u las /
kun tuf rgol ba bdag nyid kyi /g
zhes sogs kyi tshigs bcad bcu gsum gyis rgyas par [456; f. 18a] ’chad
pa yin no //
x5. ’o na sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba’ang byas pa’i rtags
kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa’i rang rten gyi chos can yin par thal /
’dod pa’i phyir zer na
x6. mi mtshungs te / rtags yang dag yin na shes ’dod chos can gyi
steng du ’god tshul dang mthun par grub dgos pas / rtog pa la sgra ma
yin pa las log par snang ba kun btags yin pas byas pa dang mthun lugs
med pa’i phyir / der thal / dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las /
d bsTan dar: bor.
e Pramān. asamuccayavr. ttti(a) ad III.2cd See n. 12.
f PV Tib.: tu. bsTan dar: du.
g Pramān. avārttika IV.136. See n. 17.
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byas pas sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang
ba’i snang ldogh dngos por med pas byas pa’i rtags de la ’grub pai minj gyi / snang
gzhi sgra la grubk dgos te / dngos pol rtags dang bsgrub bya’i chos su byed pa’i
gnad kyis so //m
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir / khyab ste / dngos po rtags dang bsgrub bya’i
chos su bkod pa’i rtags sbyor gyi shes ’dod chos can la rtog pa’i snang
ba mi ’jog par shin tu gsal zhing / rNam nges dar t.ık las kyang /
rtog pa la nam mkha’ snang ba sngar gyi rtags de nges pa’i gzhi chos can yin la /
rtog pa la sgrar snang ba byas par nges pa’i gzhir mi rung ba’i phyir mi mtshungs
so //n
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /
x7. mdor na Bye brag pa’i ngor nam mkha’ chos can du bkod kyang
de chos can du ma song bar de’i snang ba chos can du song zhing /
byas pa’i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa’i tshe rtog pa la sgrar
snang ba chos can du mi ’gro bar sgra nyid rang rten gyi chos can du
’gro ba’i rgyu mtshan mthar gtugs na / Sangs rgyas pa dang Bye brag
pa gnyis ka’i ngor chos [457; f. 18b] can mthun snang ba yod med la
gtugs pa yin te / Sangs rgyas pas nam mkha’ thogs reg bkag tsam gyi
med dgag tu ’dod pa gang zhig / Bye brag pas sgrub pa rang dbang
ba’i dngos por ’dod pa’i phyir /
x8. ’o na sgra yang de gnyis ka’i ngor mthun snang du grub pa med
par thal. Sangs rgyas pas sgra ’byung ’gyur du ’dod pa gang zhig /
Bye brag pas sgra nam mkha’i yon tan du ’dod pa’i phyir zhe na /
x9. shin tu mi mtshungs te / de gnyis ka’i ngor nyan shes kyi gzung
byar gyur pa’i don tsam zhig ma ’khrul ba’i tshad mas rnyed don du
mthun snang du grub pa yod la / nam mkha’ la ming tsam ma gtogs
mthun snang du grub pa’i don btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa’i gnad
kyis so //
x10. gzhan yang lCang skya thams cad mkhyen pas / rGyal tshab
rjes rtog pa’i snang ba chos can du bzhed kyang / mKhas grub rjes
sgra don chos can du mi bzhed par gsungs la / kun mkhyen ’Jam
dbyangs bzhad pas / gtso bo chos can du bzung ba Phyogs glang gi
dgongs pa dang / rtog pa’i snang ba chos can du bzung ba Chos grags
kyi dgongs pa yin gsungs kyang / dgongs pa zhib tu brtag na Phyogs
h dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris f. 10a and other editions in Tillemans (1984) p. 385:
snang ldog. bsTan dar: snang ldog dang.
i Zin bris: ’grub. bsTan dar: sgrub.
j Zin bris: min. bsTan dar: ma yin.
k Zin bris: grub. bsTan dar: sgrub.
l Zin bris f. 10a and other editions: dngos po. bsTan dar: dngos pos.
m dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris, f. 9b–10a. See Tillemans (1984) p. 385.
n rNam nges dar t. ı̄k, f. unidentified.
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glang yab sras dang rJe yab sras su’i lungs byas kyang / gtso bo chos
can / rnam ’gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len du med de / rman ’gyur sna
tshogs kyi nyer len du ma dmigs pa’i phyir / zhes pa’i sbyor ba ’di
la mtshon na / gtso bo ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log
par snang ba rtags sbyor de’i chos can du ’dzin rigs pa la sus kyang
bsnyon du med de / dBu ma snang ba las /
byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar btags pa blo la rnam
pao yod [458; f. 19a] pa nyid chos can yin te / de’i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo
la sogs pa ’gog par byed do //p
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /
x11. khyab ste / blo la rnam pa yod pa nyid chos can yin zhes pas
rtog pa’i snang ba chos can du ’dzin par gsal zhing / Rang don le’ur /
sgra don chos ni rnam pa gsum //q
zhes dang / Rang ’grel las /
de bas na chos can de la brten nas cir gto bo’i sgra las snang ba’i don ’di ni /
[dngos po nye bar len pa can nam ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod
par byed do]s
zhes dang / de’i ’grel bshad du / Sa kya blos kyang /
gtso bo la sogs pa’i sgras brjod par bya ba de nyid ni chos can yin la /t
zhes dang / rNam ’grel t.ık chen rigs pa’i rgya mtsho las /
de ltar rtog pa’i snang ba thams cad sgra don yin no zhes spyir bstan pas gtso bo
’dzin pa’i rtog pau la gtso bor snang ba’ang sgra don du grub la / de ltar gtso bo’i
sgra don gyi gzhi ldog rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid rtags sbyor de’i chos
can yin zhes bya ba’i don no //v
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /
x12. de la kho na re / gtso bo’i sgra don chos can / rtags sbyor de’i
chos can yin par thal / gtso bo ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba
rtags sbyor de’i chos can yin pa’i phyir na /
o rnam pa not in Peking and sDe dge editions of Madhyamakāloka. See n. 24
p P. 190a, D. 174a. See n. 24.
q Pramān. avārittika I.205cd: śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayah. //.
r Svavr. tti Tib.: ci. bsTan dar: spyi. See n. 26.
s Pramān. avārttikasvavr. tti ad PV I.206 (P. 477a3–4; D. 321a2): de bas na chos can
’di la brten nas ci gtso bo’i sgra las snang ba’i don ’di ni [dngos po nye bar len pa
can nam* ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod** par byed do] /. (*P. omits
nam. **P.D. spyod) Skt. ed Gnoli p. 106: tad atra dharmin. i vyavasthitāh. [sadasattvam.
cintayanti] (/) kim ayam. pradhānaśabdapratibhāsy artho [bhāvopādāno na veti]/. See
n. 26.
t Pramān. avārttikat. ı̄kā P. 279b7, D. 238a3.
u rNam ’grel t. ı̄k chen: gtso ’dzin rtog pa.
v Vol. tha f. 149a.
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x13. ma khyab /
x14. khyab par thal / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba gtso bo’i sgra don
yin pa’i phyir na /
x15. yang ma khyab / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par yod
pa’i phyir te / T. ık chen de nyid las /
des na gtso bo ni yod pa ma yin te ma dmigs pa’i phyir zhes pa’i rtags kyi shes
’dod chos can ni / gtso bo dngos po ba yang ma yin la / gtso bo’i sgra don gyi
rang ldog kyang ma yin gyi / ’o na ci zhe na / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid
Grangs can [459; f. 19b] paw dag gtso bo khyad par lnga ldan du ’dod la / rang
lugs la sgra don du ’dod pas / khyad par lnga ldan gyi gtso bo yin min rtsod pa’i
gzhi yin pa’i phyir rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba chos can du gzung bar byas pa yin
no //x
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par phye
ba skabs ’dir shin tu gces so //
x16. de yang Grang can pas de lta bu’i rtog pa’i snang ba khas len
kyang snang ba de sgra don du khas mi len pa’i gnad la thug pa yang
yin te / Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel /
yang blun po kha cig gis de lta bu bdag gi sgra don chos can yin no zhes zer ba
ni / de lta bu bdag gi sgra don med par khas blangs pa yin pas rang gi mtshang
bsgrags pa yin no //y
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /
x17. de ltar rtog pa’i snang ba chos can du rigs mod / ’on kyang pha
rol po’i ’dod pa ’gog pa na rtog pa’i snang ba tshig zin la chos can du
’god dgos pa yang ma yin no // ’o na ci zhe na / spyi gtso bo dang
rtag pa’i dbang phyug dang gang zag rang rkya ba sogs pha rol pos
gang khas blangs pa de nyid ji lta ba bzhin chos can du dngos su ’god
dgos te / de lta ma yin na gtso bo la sogs pa rang ldog nas mi khegs
pa’i skyon yod pa’i phyir te / rNam ’grel thar lam gsal byed las /
de dag gi dgongs pa mkhas pa’i dbang po Ka ma la sı las / gtso bo nyid chos can
du bzung nas dgag dgos kyi / de min na rnam ’gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len yin pa
khegs kyang / gtso bo rang ldog nas mi khegs par ’gyur la / rtags tshad mas nges
pa’i gzhi ni gtso bor snang ba nyid la bzhed do //z
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /
x18. de la gal te rtog pa’i snang ba [460; f. 20a] chos can du ’dzin
mi rigs par thal / de don byed nus stong yin pa’i phyir / khyab te / don
byed nus pa ma yin na rgol ba rtog ldan gyi dpyad gzhir mi rung bas
khyab pa’i phyir / de skad du rNam ’grel las /
w rNam ’grel t. ı̄k chen reads gangs can pa, which is surely wrong.
x rNam ’grel t. ı̄k chen vol. tha f. 149a–b.
y F. 151b.
z F. 95b–96a.
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don byed nus pa ma yin la //
don gnyer brtag pas ci zhig bya //
ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhes //
’dod ldanaa rnams kyis brtag ci phan //bb
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir na /
x19. ma khyab ste / lung de’i don ni rang ’dod pa’i ’bras bu gzhi
de las ’grub tu re nas dpyod pa’i gzhi la don byed nus pa dgos zhes
pa yin pas / de ni dper na ’khrig pa’i bde ba don du gnyer ba’i bud
med kyis / ma ning khyad gzhir bzung nas des skyes pa’i bya ba byed
par go nas de’i gzugs mdzes mi mdzes la dpyod pa dang ’dra bas mi
’thad ces ston pa yin gyi / spyir dgag sgrub kyi gzhi la don byed nus
stong rung bar ma zad / dgag sgrub byed pa’i dngos kyi rten la sgra
don nges can du dgos pa’i phyir / der thal / byas pa’i rtags kyis sgra
la rtagcc dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub pa’i dngos kyi rten sgra don
yin dgos pa’i rgyu mtshan yang / dgag sgrub byed pa’i rtog pa rnams
sgra don la brten pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis yin pa’i phyir / gZhan don le’u
las /
phyi rol rten min sgra don la //
brten nas ’dir ni sgrub pa dang //
dgag pa thams cad ’dod pa yin //dd
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir dang / sgra’i steng du rtag pa dgag pa dang mi
rtag pa sgrub ces pa’i don yang rtog pa’i don byed pa yin pas / de’i
tshe dgag sgrub byed pa’i rtog pa de dag la sgra dang byas mi rtag
sogs rang mtshan pa dngos su mi [461; f. 20b] snang ba’i phyir / de
skad du dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las /
Phyogs glang gis gsungs pa’i don rNam ’grel las /
dpag bya dpog par byed pa yiee //
don gyi tha snyad gnas pa ’di //
shes pa la grub tha dad la //
brten nas rnam par brtags paff yin //gg
aa PV Tib.: ’dod ldan (= kāminyāh. ). bsTan dar: rtog ldan.
bb Pramān. avārttika I.211: arthakriyāśamarthasya vicāraih. kim. tadarthinām / s.an. -
d. hasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāh. kim. parı̄ks.ayā //.
cc bsTan dar: rtags.
dd Pramān. avārttika IV.228bcd: [tasmād] āśritya śabdārtham. [bhāvābhāvasamāś-
rayam] / abāhyāśrayam atres. t.am. sarvam. vidhinis. edhanam /. See n. 34.
ee PV Tib, Zin bris: yi. bsTan dar: dag.
ff PV Tib, Zin bris: brtags pa. bsTan dar: dag pa.
gg Pramān. avārttika IV.183: anumānānumeyārthavyavahārasthitis tv iyam / bhedam.
pratyayasam. siddham avalambya prakalpyate //. The text of PV Tib. cited in dBu ma
rgyan gyi zin bris shows none of bsTan dar’s “variants”.
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zhes gsungs pa ltar / gzhi dngos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa dang du ba la
lahh me yod du sgrub pa la yang / rtog pa la sgra dang la gnyis de gnyis ma yin
pa las log par snang ba’i don nyid dgag sgrub kyi dngos rten yin gyi / sgra dang la
nyid dngos kyi rten ma yin te / dgag sgrub byed pa’i rtog pa la dngos su mi snang
ba’i phyir dang/ii
zhes gsungs pa’i phyir / dgag sgrub rtog pa’i don byed ces pa’i don
yang dper na byas pa’i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa’i phyogs
chos grub pa na / phyi rgol de’i rtog ngo na / sgra dang por grub nas
de’i rjes su sgra la byas pa gsar du brten pa lta bu’i snang tshul yod
cing / gnas tshod la rim pa de ’dra med pa’i don no //
NOTES
 This article is the result of a collaboration that took place between the authors in
seminars at Lausanne in May 1996 and at Ann Arbor in September 1997 as part of
the exchange agreement between the University of Lausanne and the University of
Michigan. The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge financial support from
the two universities and from the Elisabet de Boer Foundation.
1 See n. 17 and 7.
2 See Mimaki (1976) pp. 60–61.
3 See e.g. his Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan smad cha f. 76a1–7 (p. 151). Sakya
mchog ldan’s position turns on the Rigs gter ba apoha theory’s contrast between
theoretical explanation (’chad pa) and pratical application (’jug pa) and especially
the contrast between an object of conceptual thought as it really is (song tshod) (i.e.
a mental representation) and what we mistakenly assume it to be (rlom tshod). See
Tillemans (1995) p. 869 and n. 19, Dreyfus (1997) pp. 161, 163, 167 et passim. Note
that this latter schema, i.e. song tshod kyi chos can and rlom tshod kyi chos can
is applied to the problem of asrayasiddha in a way that does not seem to coincide
fully with the svadharmin and kevaladharmin contrast. See n. 13 on svadharmin vs.
kevaladharmin.
4 Selections from his work on particulars and universals, i.e. his Rang mtshan spyi
mtshan gyi rnam bzhag rtsom ’phro, have been translated in Klein (1991). A translation
of his commentary on the Heart Sutra appears in Lopez (1988), pp. 137–159. His
work on the proof of the Buddha’s authority in Dharmakırti’s Praman. avarttika, i.e.
the sTon pa tshad ma’i skyes bur sgrub pa’i gtam, has been translated and studied
in Tillemans (1993). Lopez (1987) refers to many parts of bsTan dar’s gCig du bral
gyi rnam bzhag. Finally, elements of bsTan dar’s grammatical work, the Sum cu pa
dang rtags ’jug gi don go sla bar bsdus pa’i bshad pa skal ldan yid kyi pad ma
’byed pa’i snang ba’i mdzod, have been studied in T. Tillemans and D. Herforth,
Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan, Vienna, 1989.
5 Cf. Madhyamakalam. kara, k. 1: nih. svabhava amı bhavas tattvatah. svaparoditah.
/ ekanekasvabhavena viyogat pratibimbavat // – Santaraks.ita proposes to show that
entities accepted by Buddhists as well as those advocated by non-Buddhist adversaries
are without any intrinsic nature (svabhava) because of being neither one nor many
different things. Skt. in Bodhicaryavatarapa~njika 173.17–18; translation Ichigo (1985)
p. cxxxv. Note that following rGyal tshab’s dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang (Sarnath
hh See Tillemans (1984) p. 385, n. 12 on du ba la la. bsTan dar: du bas la. Zin bris
f. 9b: du ba la.
ii F. 9a–b. Tillemans (1984) p. 384.
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edition, 1976) p. 80, the refutation of partless consciousness is in the context of
the refutation of the Sautrantika view that the “manifold is non-dual” (sna tshogs
gnyis med pa). The Madhyamaka argues that the aspects/images (rnam pa; akara)
cannot be substantially distinct (rdzas tha dad) from each other, because they are not
substantially distinct from a partless unitary consciousness (shes pa cha med gcig).
mDo sde pa’i lugs dgag pa la / sna tshogs gnyis med pa / sgo nga phyad tshal ba
/ rnam shes grangs mnyam pa’i lugs dgag pa’o // dang po ni / shes sogs bzhi la /
shes pa gcig la sngo ser dkar dmar sogs rnam pa du ma shar ba’i tshe rnam pa de
rnams rdzas tha dad min par thal / de rnams shes pa cha med gcig dang tha dad
min pa’i phyir /. Cf. Madhyamakalam. kara 34 et sq.; cf. also Tsong kha pa’s dBu
ma rgyan gyi zin bris f. 8a (Sarnath ed. p. 41; transl. Tillemans [1984] p. 365): gal
te sbyor ba ’di rang rgyud du byed na / gzhan gyis smras pa’i bdag dang dbang
phyug la sogs pa dang / rang sdes smras pa’i sdug bsngal dang/ shes pa cha med
kyi chos can ma grub pas / phyogs chos ma grub par ’gyur bas mi ’thad do zhe na /
– the entities accepted by others include the atman and Isvara, while those accepted
by the Buddhists include suffering, partless consciousnesses and so forth.
6 The term is an adaptation of the Indian Buddhist requirement that debate be about
what the opponent desires to know (jij~nasa, jij~nasita), i.e. whether a certain property
qualifies a certain subject. Cf. e.g. Nyayabindut.ıka ad III. 92: prativadino hi yaj
jij~nasitam. tat prakaran. apannam /. On the term shes ’dod chos can (*jij~nasitadharmin),
see the definition in Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs (ed. Onoda) p. 17.
7 For the varieties of asiddhahetu, see Nyayabindu (NB) III.57 et sq. (transl.
Stcherbatsky p. 172ff.) and in particular NB III.65 on dharmyasiddha; for the dGe
lugs pa classification see Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs, p. 57, which speaks of a triple
classification of asiddhahetu, those which are due to objective facts (don la ltos
pa), due to attitudes (blo la ltos pa) such as doubt, and those which are due to
the debaters (rgol ba la ltos pa) having incompatible views on the nature of the
subject. The “reason that is unestablished (asiddha) because of the nonexistence of
the entity of the subject” (chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa’i gtan tshig)
is a subdivision of the first category.
8 On these two types of negation, see Kajiyama (1973) p. 167f. and the references
in his n. 1. Indian Buddhist logicians had the important insight that proving a mere
negation of existence is, in its logical structure, quite different from proving positive
qualities, and that in the former case (i.e. simple denial along the lines of “it is not
so that S is existent”) subject failure is not a problem at all whereas in the latter case
it is. Cf. Matilal (1970). Tibetan explanations of asrayasiddha, such as those found
in dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris and lCang skya grub mtha’, generally cite a passage
from Kamalasıla’s Madhyamakaloka as being the source for this idea. The quotation
in question is found in Madhyamakaloka D. 172a6–b1, P. 188a3–6: gang la dngos
po’i chos yod pa’i ngo bor sgrub par mi ’dod kyi don kyang sgro btags pa’i chos
rnam par gcad pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par ’dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid
la sogs pa’i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa’i chos can mi
dgos te / de ni de’i chos ma yin pa’i phyir ro // de la ltos nas kyang de’i chos can
nyid du mi ’thad pa’i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med
na de mi ’byung ba’i gtan tshigs mngon par ’dod pa’i don grub pa la gegs byed pa
med pa’i phyir ro //; translated in Lopez (1987) p. 358. On Kamalasıla’s different
treatment of asrayasiddha in his earlier Madhyamakalam. karapa~njika and in the later
Madhyamakaloka, see Kobayashi (1989). The Tibetan dGe lugs pa treatment of the
problem has been developed in detail in Lopez (1987) pp. 168–180, Klein (1991)
pp. 118–119, 173–181 et passim.
In fact the central idea in the Madhyamakaloka that one avoided asrayasiddha when
the property being proved was a simple negation was already clearly formulated well
before Kamalasıla. What we find in the Indian Buddhist literature is that Dharmakırtian
commentators, like Devendrabuddhi and Sakyabuddhi, in their explanations of
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Praman. avarttika IV k. 136–148, emphasize the idea that subjects, like space, taken
as real (dngos por gyur pa = vastubhuta) by the opponents, are kevala in nonexistence
proofs where the property to be proved and the reason are “mere exclusions” (rnam
par gcod pa tsam = vyavacchedamatra); in these special cases, the subjects can
be negated with impunity. Although Devendrabuddhi himself does not gloss these
“mere exclusions” by the notion of non-implicative negations (prasajyapratis. edha)
so often invoked in Buddhist philosophy, the transition is very natural and is, indeed,
explicitly made by Sakyabuddhi: mere exclusion means that no entity or positive
property is stated, implied or presupposed. See Praman. avarttikapa~njika D. 296b4
et seq. and Praman. avarttikat.ıka D. 269a4–5: gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa’i ngo
bo ma grub pa nyid ma yin no zhes bya ba ni / cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir
/ zhes bya ba’i gtsan tshigs rnam par gcod pa tsam gyi ngo bo med par dgag pa
tsam gyi mtshan nyid ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / dngos por gyur pa’i chos can
med na yang tha snyad pa’i chos can rnam par gcod pa tsam la gnod pa med pa’i
phyir ro //. “When [Devendrabuddhi] says ‘a logical reason that is of the nature
of an exclusion is not unestablished’, he means that a logical reason like ‘because
it is not the cause for [producing its various effects like] sound etc. all at once’,
which is of the nature of a mere exclusion, i.e. which has the character of a simple
prasajyapratis. edha, is not unestablished. This is because inspite of there being no
subject that would be a real entity, there is no invalidation of the mere exclusion of
the conventionally designated subject”. Our thanks to Mr. Ryusei Keira for making
us aware of this passage from Sakyabuddhi.
This position concerning “mere exclusion” was adopted by later Indian writers such
as Praj~nakaragupta, Kamalasıla and by Tibetans such as Tsong kha pa et al., with the
further development that it was argued that when a Buddhist logician was proving a
mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation (e.g. that such and such a pseudo-entity
did not exist), the Buddhist proponent’s intended subject, the svadharmin, was just
the conceptual image. (In the case of Dharmakırti and Devendrabuddhi it is not at
all clear that this last additional development is also attributable to them. See n. 13.)
Ngag dbang bstan shows the rough edges and pitfalls of this Indo-Tibetan attempt
to use the distinction between the two types of negation as a watertight way to
delineate between harmless subject failures and genuine asrayasiddha.
9 Unidentified in ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. The example purports to show that the
property being predicated of a nonexistent subject (like a rabbit’s horn) can be
a positive entity (vidhi) or an implicative negation: it need not necessarily be a
prasajyapratis. edha if we are to avoid asrayasiddha. The property being proved here,
viz. “being fitting (rung ba = yogya) to be designated by the word ‘moon’ ”, is
itself a positive entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar, supposedly following ’Jam dbyangs
bzhad pa, has hearkened back to the argumentation found in the pratıtibadha section
in Praman. avarttika (PV) IV.109–130, Nyayabindu III, Praman. aviniscaya III etc.,
where Dharmakırti develops the idea that any word is fitting (yogya) to designate any
object, the use and correctness of words depending only upon the speaker’s linguistic
intention (vivaks. a). Cf. PV IV. 109: arthes. v apratisiddhatvat purus. ecchanurodhinah.
/ is. t.asabdabhidheyatvasyapto ’traks.atavag janah. // “An intended word’s designatum
(abhidheya), which is in keeping with people’s wishes, is unrestricted with regard to
objects. Therefore, the person [i.e. the user of language], whose speech is unopposed,
is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of the word]”. This doctrine
of unrestricted yogyata is being alluded to in the present argument. Thus, a rabbit’s
horn is indeed fitting to be the designatum (abhidheya) of the word “moon”, in
that there is no objective or intrinsic nature found in words or objects that would
preclude such a use.
Ngag bdang bstan dar is obviously playing with a frequently found reasoning
(prayoga) called grags pa’i rtags (“reason for a conventional concept” [grags
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pa = prasiddha, pratıti]). This reasoning is given in Indian and Tibetan texts to
establish the fact that sasin (ri bong can, “that which has a rabbit”, “that which is
hare-marked”) is fitting to be the designatum of the word candra (“moon”). The
trick is to change ri bong can to ri bong rwa (“the rabbit’s horn”). On the Indian
reasoning, see Dharmottarapradıpa 184.16–17: evam. tu prayogo dras. t.avyah. yo ’rtho
vikalpavij~nanavis.ayah. sa sam. ketikena sabdena vaktum. sakyah. / yatha sakhadiman
artho vr.ks.asabdena / vikalpavij~nanavis.ayas ca sasıti / “The formal argument (prayoga)
should be regarded as follows: ‘Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition,
can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches
and so forth [can be designated] by the word ‘tree’. Now, sasin is the object of
a conceptual cognition’ ”. (The conclusion is that sasin can be designated by the
agreed upon word candra.) The usual Tibetan formulation of the prayoga is: ri bong
can la zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjod rung ba yin te / rtog yul na yod pa’i phyir /
“That which is hare-marked is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’ because
it exists as an object of conceptualization”; see Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs p. 46.
10 See Tshad ma rigs rgyan f. 117a.
11 See Lopez (1987) pp. 173–174. Just as it was shown that avoidance of asrayasiddha
is possible even where the property is a positive entity, so now Ngag bdang bstan dar
shows that the reason and property being non-implicative negations will not guarantee
that asrayasiddha is avoided. To say that the rabbit’s horn is the subtle selflessness
of the elements because it is their consummate nature is a case of asrayasiddha,
even though both the reason and the property are simple negations. In short, it
is not so that asrayasiddha is avoided if and only if the reason and property are
vyavacchedamatra. Ngag dbang bstan dar, to his credit, proposes a stricter criterion
than had his Indo-Tibetan predecessors: asrayasiddha will be avoided if and only
if the reason and property do not imply existence. The innovation here is discrete,
but it represents a radically different, and even in some ways better, approach: it
turns on the sound logical insight that certain properties (like being blue, etc.) imply
existence, while others (like “being thought of”) do not, and that subject failure will
lead to refutation in all and only the former types of cases.
12 The term rang rten chos can is most likely a Tibetan invention, based on Tibetan
writers’ choice of a rather misleading Tibetan translation of the Praman. asamuccayavr. tti
(PSV), a translation which was also reflected in the sDe dge and Co ne editions
of Praman. asamuccaya (PS) III.2. See Tillemans (1984) n. 42 for the details. In
brief, PSV(a) ad Praman. asamuccaya (PS) III.2cd reads de yang ma bsal ba’o //
mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas rang rten la’o, whereas
the Peking version of PS III.2cd and of PSV(b) have: rang gi chos can la mngon
sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba’o //. See Kitagawa
(1973) pp. 471–472. What happened is that major dGe lugs and Sa skya writers
cited PSV(a)’s text mngon sum : : : rang rten la’o without the initial de yang ma bsal
ba’o, which they probably considered to be an independent sentence due to its final
particle. Now, we do have Sanskrit fragments of PS III.2: svarupen. aiva nirdesyah.
svayam is. t.o ’nirakr. tah. / pratyaks. arthanumanaptaprasiddhena svadharmin. i // “[A valid
thesis] is one which is intended (is. t.a) by the [the proponent] himself (svayam) as
something to be stated (nirdesya) according to its essence alone (svarupen. aiva) [i.e. as
a sadhya]; [and] with regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (svadharmin), it is not
opposed (anirakr. ta) by perceptible objects (pratyaks. artha), by inference (anumana),
by authorities (apta) or by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha)”. It can be
seen that anirakr. ta = ma bsal ba, and that placing this before mngon sum : : : rten
la’o is an attempt to follow the Skt. word order, but is virtually incomprehensible
in Tibetan: hence PSV(b) and the Peking version of PS III.2 is preferrable, also
because it reads rang gi chos can (= svadharmin). Nonetheless, most Tibetan writers
seem to have chosen PSV(a)’s reading; such is the case for Tsong kha pa, Go rams
pa bSod nams seng ge, Sakya mchog ldan, but also for the earlier writer bTsun pa
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ston gzhon (13th C), who in his rNam ’grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan,
p. 438 clearly gives credence to PSV(a): rang rten la’o zhes rang gi chos can smos
pa la dgos pa ci yod : : : Finally not just Tsong kha pa, but rGyal tshab in his rNam
’grel thar lam gsal byed to PV IV k. 136–148 repeatedly phrased his explanations
in terms of rang rten chos can. In what is an ironic, but understandable blunder,
Ngag dbang bstan dar will subsequently on p. 455 argue that Dignaga himself did
not speak of rang gi chos can (svadharmin), but rather rang gyi rten.
13 Ngag dbang bstan dar has introduced one of the key themes in the Indo-Tibetan
explanations of asrayasiddha, viz. the contrast between svadharmin and kevaladharmin.
Amongst Indian authors, the starting point in their discussion of asrayasiddha consists
in Dignaga’s definition of the thesis (paks.alaks.an. a) in Praman. asamuccaya III.2,
in particular, the specification that the thesis should not be opposed (anirakr. ta) by
perception and other means of valid cognition with regard to the proponent’s own
intended subject (svadharmin. i “with regard to his own subject”). See n. 12. While
Dignaga only spoke of svadharmin, Dharmakırti in Praman. avarttika (PV) IV, k.
136–148 introduced the idea of a contrast between svadharmin and kevaladharmin,
the latter being a nominal or unrelated subject, one which may be merely stated but
which is not actually what is qualified by the property to be proved. This contrast
comes up again and again in Ngag dbang bstan dar, and indeed he mentions the
twelve Karikas in Praman. avarttika IV (not III!) as being the Indian source.
Important in the philosophical background to this discussion of svadharmin and
kevaladharmin (although not so often explicitly cited in Tibetan texts) is Dignaga’s
treatment in the Nyayamukha of the Sam. khya’s arguments concerning Primordial
Matter (pradhana) and other such postulates in the Sam. khya system. Dignaga had
argued “pradhana and so forth do not exist because they are not perceived” (na santi
pradhanadayo ’nupalabdheh. ) and spoke of “non-preception being a property of an
imagined object (kalpitasyanupalabdhir dharmah. )”. See Katsura (1992), pp. 230–231;
G. Tucci, The Nyayamukha of Dignaga, Heidelberg, 1930 pp. 16–17; Skt. fragments
in Svavr. tti (ed. Gnoli) pp. 105 and 107. This idea of an imagined subject was then
generalized by Dharmakırti to form a key part of his apoha theory. In particular, he
took the anti-Sam. khya argument in Dignaga’s Nyayamukha proving the nonexistence
of pradhana as well as the Nyayamukha’s phrase kalpitasyanupalabdhir dharmah. to
lead to the general principle in PV I, k. 205–212, the Svavr. tti and Praman. aviniscaya
III that the directly designated objects of words were always conceptual representations
(kalpana); he then maintained that although pradhana did not exist as something
real and external, its conceptual representation, or in other words, the verbal object
(sabdartha) existed, so that the charge of asrayasiddha did not apply.
In later developments, including what we find in the dGe lugs pa positions and
clearly in Ngag dbang bstan dar, the Dharmakırtian general principle of designata
being only concepts will be combined with the svadharmin vs. kevaladharmin contrast
to explain when asrayasiddha is avoidable and when it is not. Grosso modo, in
nonexistence proofs the svadharmin is the concept and no more; the kevaladharmin
is the pseudo-entity. Ngag bdang bstan dar here (following Tsong kha pa and
others) applies this point of view to PV IV.141–142’s discussion where the Buddhist
refutes the Vaises.ika’s version of space. Thus the Vaises.ika’s space becomes the
kevaladharmin, whereas the conceptual representation of space is the svadharmin,
i.e. the subject accepted by the Buddhist himself. Although the kevaladharmin is
obviously refuted, the svadharmin is not and hence asrayasiddha is avoided. However,
this synthesis is arguably a later invention. Tillemans is of the opinion that while for
a writer like Kamalasıla (who figures so prominently in the Tibetan theories) this
move to combine the notions of svadharmin and conceptual subjects is present in
his Madhyamakaloka, in the case of Dharmakırti this combination is not very likely.
The karikas in PV IV (viz. k. 141–142) that are often interpreted as supporting this
combination are probably better interpreted differently. First of all, Praj~nakaragupta’s
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Praman. avarttikabhas.ya (PVBh) ad PV IV. 141–2 clearly specified two interpretations
of the karikas at stake. One advocates proving nonexistence with regard to a subject
that is “completely derived from conceptual thought” (vikalpaparinis. t.hite dharmin. i)
and thus that the conceptual subject is the svadharmin. The other paraphrases the
controversial reasoning about space in such a way that the svadharmin becomes a
real entity acceptable to the Buddhist, namely the impermanent space that Buddhists
themselves accept. See PVBh 550.18: tathapy anityam akasam. dharmı bhavis. yati.
Secondly, this latter interpretaion in PVBh fits noticeably better into the rest of
the argumentation in PV IV, k. 136–148, where a completely parallel reasoning
against the Sam. khya sukhadi (“pleasure, etc.” = the three gun. as) is introduced by
tathaiva (“in precisely this way”) in k. 144–145. This time the svadharmin is clearly
taken by Dharmakırti as not being the conceptual representation of sukhadi, but as
being the ordinary, impermanent sensations of pleasure that the Buddhist himself
acknowledges. The impression is that reading an advocacy of the combination of
svadharmin with conceptual subjects into Dharmakırti is a later position that may
well change Dharmakırti’s own stance. The svadharmin may well have been no more
than an entity acceptable as real (and not conceptual) to the Buddhist himself. And
determining what this actual subject was seems to have involved paraphrasing of the
explicitly stated arguments, but had little to do with postulating conceptual subjects.
14 Ngag dbang bstan dar is (correctly) simplifying the argument. As it stands in
Dharmakırti, the reasoning at stake seeks to prove that space does not have “a
novel nature unproduced by other conditions”, in other words, a permanent but real
intrinsic nature. Cf. Praman. avarttika IV.141-2: yatha parair anutpadyapurvarupam. [1]
na khadikam / sakr.c chabdadyahetutvad ity ukte praha dus.akah. // tadvad vastusvabhavo
’san dharmı vyomadir ity api / naivam is. t.asya sadhyasya badha kacana[2] vidyate //
“When [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced
by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such
as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaises.ika] adversary might say that like that the
subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakırti’s
position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated(3)], there is in fact
no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (sadhya) at all.” [1] Miy.
anutpadya purvarupan is wrong; [2] Miy. kvacana – cf. Tib. ’ga’ yang; [3] PVV
evam. dharmibadhane ’pi.
15 The argument presupposes some fundamental positions in the dGe lugs pa
understanding of apoha. In brief, the dGe lugs pa explain the conceptual representation
of real space (dngos gyur gyi nam mkha’ = vastubhutakasa) as being “what appears
as excluded from the contrary of real space” (dngos gyur gyi nam mkha’ ma yin
pa las log par snang ba). They then add the additional step that not only does the
conceptual appearance/representation (snang ba) itself appear in this way but real
space itself (albeit nonexistent) also appears (snang) as excluded from the contrary
of real space. The result is that the dGe lugs can argue that the svadharmin, the
actual dharmin that is being argued about, i.e. the conceptual representation, appears
concordantly (mthun snang) to both parties in the debate. However, the Vaises.ika,
who believes in vastubhutakasa, does not know that it is only a mentally invented
concept being argued about rather than vastubhutakasa itself. The opponent thus has
the impression that he is arguing about actual space, while the Buddhist proponent
knows that they are both only arguing about the concept. This is said to be possible
because both real space itself and the representation/appearance (snang ba) appear
erroneously mixed together (’dres nas) to conceptual thought. An analysis of this type
of argumentation is to be found in Tillemans (1995); see Lopez (1987) pp. 178–179
for rGyal tshab’s use of the same type of argument; see Klein (1991) pp. 35–36
on lCang skya’s and bsTan dar’s position that “the actual object appears, mixed
with its image, to thought”; see also Yoshimizu (1997) pp. 1107–1108; Dreyfus
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(1992) p. 36 et sq. Tillemans stresses that the position that X itself appears (snang
ba) to the conceptual thought about X is by and large a dGe lugs pa-gSang phu
ba development, with problematic or no antecedents at all in India. It seems to be
equally rejected by Sa skya pas like Sakya mchog ldan; see op. cit. p. 872 et sq. In
part, the position was facilitated by the syntactical ambiguities in the Tibetan term
snang ba, which can mean “appears”, “what appears” and “appearance”.
16 See n. 12 for Praman. asamuccaya III.2cd.
17 These verses are not from the Pratyaks.a (PV III) chapter; they are from the
Pararthanumana chapter, i.e. PV IV.136–148. Nor did Dignaga use rang rten
instead of rang gi chos can (= svadharmin); see n. 12. Here are some of the
principal verses amongst the twelve. Additions generally follow Manorathanandin’s
Praman. avarttikavr. tti.
136 sarvatra vadino dharmo yah. svasadhyatayepsitah. / taddharmavati[1] badha
syan nanyadharmen. a dharmin. i //
“Always, invalidation (badha) [of the thesis] would occur in a case of [invalidation
of] the possessor of that property (dharma) that the proponent himself intends to
prove (sadhya), but not in the case of a subject (dharmin) [that is qualified] by some
other property.”
143 dvayasyapi hi sadhyatve sadhyadharmoparodhi yat /
badhanam. dharmin. as tatra badhety etena varn. itam //
“Indeed, given that both are to be proved (sadhyatva), then when invalidating the
subject negates the property to be proved, in that case there will be an invalidation [of
the thesis]. Such is what is expressed by the [words ‘his own subject’ (svadharmin)].”
147 svayam is. t.o yato dharmah. sadhyas tasmat tadasrayah. /
badhyo na kevalo nanyasam. srayo veti sucitam //
“It was asserted [by Dignaga] that as the property that [the proponent] intends himself
is what is to be proved (sadhya), therefore, the basis of this [property] is what is to
be invalidated, and not something nominal or the basis for a [property] other [than
the one being proved].”
[1] Read taddharmavati instead of Miyasaka’s tad dharmavati.
18 Ngag dbang bstan dar refers here to one of the three characteristics (rupa) of
valid reasons: the paks.adharmatva (“[the reason’s] being a quality of the subject”).
Cf. the definition of the paks.adharma(tva) in Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs p. 23: de sgrub
kyi shes ’dod chos can skyon med kyi steng du ’god tshul dang mthun par yod
pa nyid du tshad mas nges pa “It [i.e. the reason] is ascertained by a praman. a to
exist relative to the faultless subject of enquiry in accordance with the mode of
presentation”. The ’god tshul “mode of presentation” in Ngag dbang bstan dar (as in
Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs) refers to the type of verb stated in the reason, i.e. the copula
yin as in e.g. byas pa yin pa’i phyir or byas pa’i phyir “because : : : is a product”
or the existential yod as in du ba yod pa’i phyir “because there is smoke” – we
thus have the possibility of yin ’god or yod ’god. The point of including ’god tshul
dang mthun par in the definition of the paks.adharma(tva) is a rather cumbersome
way to guarantee that the subject possesses the property of the reason in the very
same way as the proponent has stated, i.e. yin or yod.
19 Ngag dbang bstan dar’s reply here and in what follows turns on the principle
that the reason must be a property of the subject, i.e. of the svadharmin: in other
words, the reason must be a paks.adharma (see n. 18). Now, when we prove that
space is not a permanent substance, the conceptual representation of space is indeed
not a substance, and will also be qualified by the reason. Thus the paks.adharmatva
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will hold. On the other hand, if we are validly proving that sound is impermanent
because it is produced, then sound itself (and not the concept of sound) must be
the svadharmin. This is because sound is both impermanent and something causally
produced – hence the paks.adharmatva holds with regard to that subject, i.e. sound
qua particular, rather than the concept of sound. See Lopez (1987) pp. 175–176.
20 On the Tibetan development of the problem of chos can mthun snang ba
(“concordantly appearing subjects”) see D. Lopez (1987), p. 78 et passim; Hopkins
(1989); Yotsuya (1995); Tillemans (1990), p. 42f.; Tillemans and Tomabechi (1995)
n. 25. The term chos can mthun snang ba is a Tibetan invention with no Sanskrit
equivalent. The notion is developed by Tsong kha pa in Lam rim chen mo, Drangs
nges legs bshad snying po and other works as a philosophical elaboration upon a
section in the Bhavaviveka-Candrakırti debate in Prasannapada I, p. 26 et sq. (ed. L.
de la Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, reprint Osnabruck, 1970), where Realist
and Sunyavadin conceptions are argued to be radically incommensurable so that there
are no commonly acknowledged (ubhayaprasiddha) subjects when the two parties
are debating about ultimate truth – see Tillemans (1992) n. 5 for a translation of
the passage from Prasannapada. The issue is also taken up by non-dGe lugs pa
writers (such as Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge in his lTa ba’i ngan sel f. 41af.),
but plays a particularly important, and undeniably complex, role in the dGe lugs pa
Svatantrika Madhyamaka system.
Ngag bdang bstan dar is presupposing an understanding of Tsong kha pa’s
position on Svatantrika. The point in the argument is delicate. Judging by the
previous discussion, bsTan dar seems to accept that the svadharmin in the Buddhist-
Vaises.ika arguments, viz. the concept of space, is what both parties are actually arguing
about – nonetheless this conceptual svadharmin, as he had said earlier, could not be
explicitly acknowledged by the Vaises.ika opponent, who thinks he is arguing about
real space (vastubhutakasa). bsTan dar then argus that space itself is incommensurable
for both parties, i.e. given the parties’ differing respective views on what space is,
a concordantly appearing and commonly acknowledged (ubhayaprasiddha) space
cannot be what they are arguing about: space is thus the kevaladharmin and cannot be
the svadharmin. (Here one could reasonably ask if the svadharmin, i.e. the concept,
appears concordantly to both, given their respective positions.) In what follows,
Ngag dbang bstan dar alludes to an objection in Prasannapada that if the Realist
and Sunyavadin have no commonly recognized subject, then nor do Buddhists and
Vaises.ikas when they argue about sound being impermanent or not, given that both
have different conceptions of what sound is; see Prasannapada p. 29. The dGe
lugs pa reply, based on Candrakırti, is that sound, irrespective of one’s philosophical
theories, is heard commonly by both parties, whereas space is just a purely theoretical
notion without any perceptual content in common for both parties.
21 Ngag bstan dar is arguing from a Svatantrika position where concordantly
appearing subjects and especially non-erroneous valid cognitions must be possible
for both parties, as this is a condition for the logical reasons being “autonomous”
(rang rgyud = svatantra). The phrase ma ’khrul ba’i tshad ma’i rnyed don du mthun
snang du grub pa (“established as appearing concordantly as an object found by
non-erroneous means of valid cognition”) alludes to the dGe lugs pa view that for
a Svatantrika, who holds a type of limited realism, a praman. a is non-erroneous in
apprehending its objects as being established by their own intrinsic natures (rang gi
mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). Note that for a Pasa _ngika, by contrast, a praman. a can
supposedly never be correct in this way, because these intrinsic natures do not exist
at all, and thus for him all praman. as without exception would be erroneous. The
incommensurability between Realist and Sunyavadin then lies in the fact that the
way the subject is established by a praman. a (tshad mas grub tshul) will differ for
the two parties, the realist taking the praman. a as non-erroneous and the Sunyavadin
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holding it to be erroneous. Cf. sTong thun chen mo p. 496 (f.157b3–6): des na
mdor bsdus te go bde bar brjod na / rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa’i gzhal
bya la ma ’khrul pa’i tshad mas rnyed don yin par snga rgol phyi* rgol gnyi ga’i
lugs la mthun snang du grub pa’i chos can gyi steng du / snga rgol gang la dpag
’dod zhugs pa’i bsgrub bya’i chos sgrub byed kyi gtan tshigs su bkod pa / zhes
pa rang rgyud kyi rtags kyi don yin la / chos can de nyid tshad mas ’grub tshul
snga rgol phyi rgol gnyi ga’i mthun snang du grub pa med kyang spyir chos can
de nyid snga rgol gyi lugs la’ang tshad mas grub phyi rgol gyi lugs la’ang tshad
mas grub cing chos can dang phyogs chos sogs phyi rgol lugs la tshad mas grub
pa’i khas blangs la ’khrid nas bkod pa’i gtan tshigs ni gzhan la grags kyi rjes
dpag ces bya’o //. *Text has gyi. “So let us summarize and explain [things] in an
easily comprehensible manner (sic!). The meaning of ‘autonomous logical reason’
(rang rgyrd kyi rtags = svatantrahetu) is: what is presented as a logical reason
establishing the sadhyadharma that the proponent wishes to infer on the basis of a
dharmin established as appearing concordantly (mthun snang du grub pa) for both
the proponent’s and the opponent’s traditions, namely, [appearing concordantly] as
being an entity found by a praman. a that is unmistaken with regard to prameyas
established by their own characters (rang gi mtshan nyid = svalaks.an. a). [As for
‘opponent-acknowledged’ inferences:] Although the way in which this dharmin is
established by praman. as does not appear concordantly for both the proponent and
opponent, nonetheless in general (spyir) this dharmin is established by a praman. a
in the opponent’s tradition and is also established by a praman. a in the opponent’s
tradition; when the logical reason is presented after we have ‘guided’ (’khrid nas) the
dharmin, paks.adharma and so forth in terms of positions established by a praman. a
in the opponent’s tradition, this is said to be an ‘opponent-acknowledged inference’
(gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpag).”
22 See Lopez (1987); pp. 178–179.
23 Cf. n. 13 for Dignaga’s arguments against the Sam. khya.
24 bsTan dar cites Madhyamakaloka somewhat out of context, as if the quote was
unproblematically Kamalasıla’s own position. In fact, it is to be found in a very
long purvapaks.a where a logician’s position is presented, one which Kamalasıla
replied to by drawing partial parallels with his own philosophical project of proving
ultimate lack of intrinsic nature (nih. svabhavata). The logician’s position, which looks
to be a type of Alıkakaravada (“false images”), held that: (a) the dharmin is said
to be a mental entity, but in reality is not mind and has no real existence at all,
being only an imagined and unreal mental image (akara); (b) the ordinary person
erroneously conflates the image with the objects themselves; (c) mind really exists
although the images are unreal. (Note that Santaraks.ita and Kamalasıla are usually
represented in texts on philosophical tenets (grub mtha’ = siddhanta) as leaning
towards Satyakaravada (rnam bden dang mthun pa); see Mimaki (1982) pp. 29–31,
35.) See Madhyamakaloka D. 174a–175al (P. 190a–191a): ji ste thog ma med pa’i
rang gi sa bon yongs su smin pa las yang dag par byung ba’i rnam par rtog pas
yongs su bsgrubs pa / byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar
brtags pa blo la yod pa nyid chos can yin te / de’i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo la
sogs pa ’gog par byed do // de ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang rnam par
’khrul pa’i dbang gis phyi rol lta bu dang / gtso bo la sogs pa dang / tha mi dad
pa lta bu dang / nus pas pas stong pa la sogs pa’i chos mtha’ dag dang ldan pa
lta bur rtog go // de la gtso bo la sogs pa’i ngo bo nyid dgag pa sgrub pa la gtso
bo la sogs pa dgag pa bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag gzhi gcig pa nyid
kyang grub pa kho na yin te / ’di ltar de nyid byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang /
gtso bo la sogs pa nyid du nye bar gzung ba rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag kyang
rab rib can gyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin du de dang tha mi dad par sems
pa kho nas tha snyad ’dogs pa’i phyir // de ni blos kun brtags pa yin yang de’i
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rnam pa nyid kyis blo zhes nye bar ’dogs te / ’di dngos su ni blo’i ngo bo yang ma
yin te / de ni de dang mtshan nyid mi mthun pa’i ngo bo nyid du snang ba’i phyir
ro // de’i phyir de ngo bo med pa nyid du rab tu bsgrubs kyang blo ngo bo nyid
med pa nyid du thal ba ni ma yin te / de la phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pa’i ngo
nyid dgag pa tshad mas sgrub par byed kyi / de nyid dgag pa’i phyir gtan tshigs
sbyor ba ma yin no / : : : de’i phyir rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / rjes su dpag pa
la sogs pa’i tha snyad ’di thams cad ni blo la yod pa’i chos can kho na brten nas
’jug pa nyid de / rnam pa gzhan mi srid pa’i phyir ro zhes bya bar ’dod na /
gal te de lta yin na / ’o na don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun brtags
pa’i chos can la brten nas dgag pa la sogs pa rab tu sgrub par byed pa la yang
gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa’i nyes pa mi ’jug na ci ste nan gyis kho bo cag
la klan ka tshol byar byed / ji ltar khyed don dam pa la ’jug par bya ba’i phyir
gtso bo la sogs pa dgag par kun brtags pa’i chos can kho na la bsgrub par bya
ba dang / sgrub pa’i sems pa rgyas par byed pa de bzhin du kho cag kyang gzugs
dang sgra la sogs pa grags pa dag la / yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa’i ngo bo
nyid du sgro btags pa dgag par byis pa rnams la de dag sgyu ma dang / smig rgyu
dang / rmi lam dang / gzugs brnyan dang mtshungs pa nyid du ston par byed do
// de la ji ltar brtags pa’i chos can la dngos po’i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags pa la
sogs pa bkag tu zin kyang rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag la snang ba’i phyir ma
grub pa nyid la sogs pa’i nyes pa mi ’jug pa de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yang
gnag rdzi’i chung ma yan chad kyi skye bo la snang ba’i phyir ji ltar ma grub pa
nyid du ’gyur //.
“[Objection:] – It is just something existing in the mind that is the subject,
[something] established by conceptualisations stemming from the ripening of their
own beginningless [karmic] tendencies [and] which is metaphorically designated by
the infantile as being external and real. Thus it is with reference to that [fictional
mental existent] that one negates pradhana and so forth. Although that [mental
existent] does not ultimately have any nature, still, due to error, it is conceived of
as if it were external, as if it were not different from pradhana and the like, and as
if it had all the various properties like being void of efficacity and so forth. In that
case, when we negate the natures of pradhana and so forth, the sadhya consisting of
negations of pradhana, etc. and the sadhana [for these negations] not only have the
same locus but are in fact established. This is because the infantile grasp this [mental
existent] alone as being external and as being pradhana, etc. and the proponent and
opponent both apply conventional designations simply because they think that this
[mental existent] is not different from [the pseudo-entities themselves], just as when
a person suffering from [the eye-disease] timira sees the moon as two. Although this
[mental existent] is something [merely] imagined by the mind, it is metaphorically
designated as the mind due to its being an image. In reality, however, it is not of the
nature of the mind, in that it appears as something different in character from the
[mind]. Hence even though it is acknowledged that this [mental existent] is without
any nature, it does not follow that the mind is without nature. In that case, the
negations of natures such as the external and pradhana, etc. are proven by means
of a praman. a. But one does not apply the logical reasons in order to negate the
[mind] itself. : : : Consequently, all these conventions, like inferable objects (anumeya),
inferring [reasons] (anumana) and so forth, operate only in reliance upon subjects
existing in the mind. Any other way is impossible.
[Reply:] Suppose this were so. Now, even when one proved negations and so forth
in reliance upon imagined subjects, though they be ultimately without any nature, no
fault like asrayasiddha, etc. would be committed. So then why direct your criticisms
so vociferously against us! Just as you develop ideas of sadhya and sadhana in
reliance upon imagined subjects in order to negate pradhana etc. so that you may have
access to the ultimate, in the same fashion we too, in order to negate superimpositions
of natures like existence and nonexistence, etc. upon commonly recognized things
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like form and sound, demonstrate to the infantile that these [commonly recognized
things like form, etc.] are like illusions, mirages, dreams and reflections. In that
case, just as [for you], even though [you] do negate the superimposed nature of
being a real entity with reference to imagined subjects [like pradhana, etc.], there
are no faults like [asraya-]asiddha[hetu] because these [subjects] appear to both the
proponent and the opponent, so too, since form and so forth also appear to everyone
from cowherds’ wives on up, how is it that they would be unestablished (asiddha)?”
25 See n. 24.
26 bsTan dar has truncated the passage from the Svavr. tti. The additions to our
translation follow the missing portions of the Skt. and Tib. of the Svavr. tti. Note that
it is clear from the Skt. that Ngag dbang bstan dar is wrong in reading spyi gtso bo’i
sgra, and that the reading ci (= kim) gtso bo’i sgra in the bsTan ’gyur is the correct
one. Ngag dbang bstan dar seems to be have been seduced by the homonymity
of spyi and ci, plus the fact that pradhana is usually rendered as spyi gtso bo by
indigenous Tibetan authors of the dGe lugs school. Our translation of the quotation
follows the Svavr. tti’s Sanskrit and the Tibetan in the bsTan ’gyur, which must yield a
different understanding from that of Ngag dbang bstan dar himself. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to guess how the latter would have understood the passage. But a natural
reading of bsTan dar’s version of the Svavr. tti passage would be something like:
“Thus, in dependence upon this subject, this object that appears due to the word
pradhana : : : ”.
27 “Verbal object” (sgra don; sabdartha) is, for a logician, always a conceptu-
ally created entity, one having no real existence. Cf. Praman. avarttika III.287ab:
sabdarthagrahi yad yatra taj j~nanam. tatra kalpana // “Wherever a consciousness
apprehends a verbal object, it is conceptual”.
28 On gzhi ldog and the argument at issue, see n. 30.
29 See n. 30.
30 The term ldog pa (= vyavr. tti) is a pivotal term in the Indian and Tibetan apoha
theories of meaning; see Tillemans (1993) pp. 69–70, n. 6 for explanations and
references to Praman. avarttika I. The fundamental idea is that the object directly
designated by a word for X is a conceptual construction proceeding by exclusion of
all which is non-X. As for rang ldog and gzhi ldog, these are terms whose Indian
origins, if indeed they have any, seem quite obscure. The terms figure preeminently
in the bsDus grwa literature (and hence in dGe lugs pa praman. a commentaries) as
part of a scholastic category of different sub-types of the Indian logician’s notion of
vyavr. tti, including also don ldog (“exclusion qua object”) and spyi ldog (“exclusion
qua universal”). Given their place in a literature heavily influenced by the Tshad
ma bsdus pa texts of gSang phu traditions, it is not unlikely that the interpretation
of these four sub-varieties of vyavr. tti, and possibly even their origin, is due to the
gSang phu traditions stemming from Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge. See e.g. the third
chapter of Yongs ’dzin bsdus grwa chung, the chapter concerning ldog pa ngos ’dzin
“recognizing exclusions” (in Textbooks of Se-ra Monastery for the Primary Course
of Studies ed. T. Kelzang and S. Onoda, Kyoto, 1985). The argumentation in Ngag
dbang bstan dar turns essentially on the distinction between knowing an object X as
being simply an X itself (rang), and knowing an instance, or basis (gzhi), of X but
under some other name or description – the first case is that of rang ldog and the
second gzhi ldog. Thus, for example, the rang ldog pertaining to a vase (bum pa’i
rang ldog), is just the vase and not, e.g., some particular bulbous golden object that
is able to carry water – the latter would be a gzhi ldog of vase. In the context at
hand, a Buddhist and a Sam. khya, when arguing about Primordial Matter, are both
arguing about a mere concept of Primordial Matter, i.e. a verbal object (sgra don).
Nonetheless they cannot be arguing about the rang ldog of the verbal object (sgra
don gyi rang ldog) of Primordial Matter because this would mean that both know
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the verbal object to be just a verbal object, i.e. a conceptually and verbally created
fiction; clearly, the Sam. khya does not know this, but thinks that Primordial Matter
is more than just a verbal object, because it is for him fully real. Thus they are
both thinking and arguing about a type of verbal object, but one that both parties
don’t consciously recognize as such – hence the insistence on the subject of their
deliberations being the gzhi ldog of a verbal object. See also n. 15 on the dGe lugs
pa idea of an object (like Primordial Matter, etc.) and its conceptual representation
appearing “mixed” (’dres nas snang ba) and hence indistinguishable to the opponent.
31 Literally, “from their exclusions qua the things themselves”. On rang ldog, see
n. 30 On the argument at stake, see n. 32.
32 The point is that if we explicitly presented the subject as being something along
the lines of the concept of Primordial Matter, and not Primordial Matter itself, we
would not actually succeed in refuting Primordial Matter. The argument would not tell
against the Sam. khya opponent, who is convinced that there really is such an entity
and that it is a fortiori not a mere concept. On the other hand, when we establish
by means of a praman. a that the reason is a property of the subject (paks.adharma),
then the subject can only be the conceptual construct, i.e. only the appearance as
Primordial Matter (gtso bor snang ba nyid). The argument at stake is, in fact, that
both the kevaladharmin and svadharmin have their purpose: the former assures that
the refutation presents the subject as the opponent conceives it, while the latter is the
proponent’s actual subject that will serve as the basis upon which will be assessed
the three characteristics of the logical reason. Finally, note that we cannot say with
any certainty which exact passages from the Madhyamakaloka rGyal tshab rje had
in mind.
33 Literally: “the reason : : : (: : : rgyu mtshan yang) : : : is also due to the reason
(rgyu mtshan gyis yin)”.
34 Praman. avarttika IV.228bcd. The whole karika reads: tasmad asritya sabdartham.
bhavabhavasamasrayam / abahyasrayam atres. t.am. sarvam. vidhinis. edhanam // (de
phyir dngos dngos med rten can // phyi rol rten min sgra don la // brten nas ’dir
ni sgrub pa dang // dgag pa thams cad ’dod pa yin //) “Therefore, we accept
that all [positive] proof and negation here [in practical activity (vyavahare)] is
in reliance upon a verbal object, which is the basis for being and non-being
[and] which has no external basis.” For the interpretation of the compounds
osamasrayam and abahyasrayam, see Praman. avarttikavr. tti: tasmac chabdasyartham
aropitabahırupam anyavyavacchedam abahyasrayam. bahyavis.ayarahitam. ya eva
bhavabhavayor vidhipratis. edhavikalpapratipadyayor samasrayas tam asritya vyavahare
sarvam. vidhinis.edhanam is.t.am/.
35 The karika is closely related to the well-known fragment attributed to Dignaga’s
Hetumukha and cited in Praman. avarttikasvavr. tti (ed. Gnoli pp. 2–3): sarva evayam
anumananumeyavyavaharo buddhyarud. hena dharmadharmibhedena. Note that the
Tibetan of k. 183c reads shes pa la grub “established in/for thought”, whereas the
Praman. avarttikavr. tti (PVV) reads pratyayena vikalpakenaikavyavr. ttimatravis.ayena
sam. siddham : : : “established by means of conceptual thought, which has as object
only an exclusion of unity.” Finally, note that Manorathanandin in PVV takes artha
as going only with anumeya, i.e. anumeyartha which is also in keeping with PV Tib.
Cf. PVV ad k. 183: ato ’numanahetutvad anumanasya li _ngasyanumeyarthasyanayor
upalaks.an. atvat (/) dharmin. as ca vyavaharasthitis tv iyam : : :
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bTsun pa ston gzhon. rNam ’grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan.
Qinghai: Zhonguo zangxue chubanshe, 1993.
D. = sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripit.aka.
Devendrabuddhi. Praman. avarttikapa~njika. P. 5717. D. 4217.
dGe ’dun grub pa. Tshad ma rigs rgyan = Tshad ma’i bstan bcos chen po
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Dharmakırti. Nyayabindu: with Dharmottara’s Nyayabindut.ıka and Durveka
Misra’s Dharmottarapradıpa. Ed. by D. Malvania, Patna: Kashi Prasad
Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955, second edition 1971.
Dharmakırti. Praman. avarttika. Ed. by Y. Miyasaka. Praman. avarttika-karika
(Sanskrit and Tibetan). Naritasan Shinshoji: Acta Indologica 2 1972, pp. 1–
206. (PV I = Svarthanumana; PV II = Praman. asiddhi; PV III = Pratyaks.a;
PV IV = Pararthanumana.)
Dharmakırti. Praman. avarttikasvavr. tti. Ed. R. Gnoli. The Praman. avarttikam.
of Dharmakırti. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome, 1960.
Dharmottara. Nyayabindut.ıka. See Dharmakırti’s Nyayabindu.
Dignaga. Praman. asamuccayavr. tti. P. 5701, D. 4204 (i.e. PSVa) transl.
Vasudhararaks.ita and Seng rgyal; P. 5702 (i.e. PSVb) transl. Kanakavar-
man and Dad pa shes rab.
Dignaga. Praman. asamuccaya. P. 5700, D. 4203
Durveka Misra. Dharmottarapradıpa. See Dharmakırti’s Nyayabindu.
Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge. lTa ba ngan sel = dBu ma la ’jug pa’i dkyus
kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so’i dka’ ba’i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan
sel. In Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum, vol. 13, Tokyo, 1969.
gSer mdog Pan. chen Sakya mchog ldan. Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan
smad cha = Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa’i ’khor los lugs
ngan pham byed. Volume 10 of Collected Writings of gSer-mdog Pan. -chen
Sakya-mchog-ldan. Reprinted by Nagwang Topgyal, Delhi, 1988.
k. = karika.
Kamalasıla. Madhyamakaloka. P. 5287, D. 3887.
Manorathanandin. Praman. avarttikavr. tti. Ed. by R. Sa _nkr.tyayana with the
notes of Vibbuticandra in the appendices to the Journal of the Bihar and
WHAT CAN ONE REASONABLY SAY ABOUT NONEXISTENCE? 129
Orissa Research Society 24 (1938) part III. Also ed. by D. Shastrı, Varanasi:
Bauddha Bharati 3, 1968.
Miy. = Y. Miyasaka’s edition of Praman. avarttika. See Dharmakırti,
Praman. avarttika.
mKhas grub rje = mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. rNam ’grel t.ık chen
= rGyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs
pa’i rgya mtsho. Collected Works, dGa’ ldan phun tshogs gling edition, Vol.
tha, da.
mKhas grub rje. sTong thun chen mo = Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi de kho na
nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos skal bzang mig ’byed. Collected
Works, Vol. ka.
mKhas grub rje. Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel = Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan
yid kyi mun sel. Collected Works, Vol. tha.
P. = Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripit.aka.
Praj~nakaragupta. Praman. avarttikabhas. ya. Ed. R. Sa _nkr.tyayana, Patna: Tibetan
Sanskrit Works 1, 1953.
rGyal tshab rje = rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. rNam ’grel thar lam gsal
byed = Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad phyin ci
ma log par gsal bar byed pa. Collected Works, Lhasa edition, Vol. cha.
rGyal tshab rje. rNam nges dar t.ık = bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam nges kyi t.ık
chen dgongs pa rab gsal. Collected Works, Vol. ja and nya.
rGyal tshab rje; dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang. Popular edition, Sarnath,
1976.
Sakyabuddhi. Praman. avarttikat.ıka. P. 5718, D. 4220.
Santaraks.ita. Madhyamakalam. kara. See Ichigo (1985).
Tsong kha pa = Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa. dBu ma dgongs pa rab
gsal = bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab
gsal. In Vol. ma of Collected Works, reproduced from prints from the 1897
Lhasa old Zhol (dGa’ ldan phun tshogs gling) blocks, New Delhi 1979.
Tsong kha pa. dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris. In Collected Works, Vol. ba; popular
edition, Sarnath 1976.
Yongs ’dzin Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho. Yongs ’dzin
rtags rigs = Tshad ma’i gzhung don ’byed pa’i bsdus grwa’i rnam par bshad
pa rigs lam ’phrul gyi lde’u mig las rigs lam che ba rtags rigs kyi skor.
References are to the edition by S. Onoda, The Yo _ns ’dzin rtags rigs – A
manual for Tibetan logic. Nagoya: Studia Asiatica 5, 1981.
TOM J.F. TILLEMANS DONALD S. LOPEZ
University of Lausanne University of Michigan
